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what people are writing about

BOOKS
The Great Executive Dream: The
First Myth of Management Is
That It Exists by Robert Heller,
Delacorte Press, New York, 1972,
294 pages, $7.95.

A British journalist takes aim, not
always accurately, but always en
tertainingly, at the management
mystique.
Mr. Heller starts this book off
with a bang:
. . management,
like the emperor’s clothes, does not
exist; the prime myth of manage
ment is that it does.”

Actually, of course, he doesn’t
mean it, for he immediately con
tradicts himself a dozen times over.
For example, six pages later he
comments, . . there is seldom any
thing wrong with a company that
better, or better-directed, execu
tives won’t cure.” What is the mean
ing of better-directed if it is not
better management?
What, then, does Mr. Heller
really mean? In part, he means
that he is skeptical of the idea that
management is a set of skills inde
pendent of the business in which
they are exercised and interchange
able among industries; “too many
executives forget that they are not
in management but in business.” In

part, too, he means that no gen
uine science—or even discipline—of
management exists as yet. Both are
familiar ideas, a good deal less icon
oclastic in fact than Mr. Heller’s
way of expressing them.
If Mr. Heller really believed
there was no such thing as man
agement, he would not have both
ered to write a book about it (or
rather, to be exact, assemble and
amplify a group of essays that orig
inally appeared in Britain’s Ob
server). For this is unquestionably a
book about management—even
though an attempt to debunk its
sacred cows—and Mr. Heller’s
choice of myths to debunk clearly
follows the standard pattern set by
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more positive approaches to man
agement.
Like chefs, says Mr. Heller, man
agers need reliable maxims, instruc
tive anecdotes, and no dogmatism.
“This is a cookbook for managers
who want to get their clothes back.”
Here, too, Mr. Heller reveals his
true colors. Few, if any cookbooks,
have been written by chefs who
denied that there was such a thing
as cooking.
Although it is full of maxims
and anecdotes, this is not a cook
book either. It is an attack on cer
tain familiar, though not univers
ally accepted, assumptions about
management. The language is ex
travagant, partly in order to attract
attention, partly because Mr. Heller
likes to write that way.
Mr. Heller is a gifted writer, al
though he is not always grammat
ical (he is prone to use “disinter
ested” where he means “uninter
ested” and “comprehensive” where
he means “comprehensible”) and
not always clear. Some of his chap
ters, for example, those debunking
computers, business schools, con
sultants, accountants, management
techniques, and organization charts,
lack any real point.
But when he is on target, he is
very witty indeed:
On the myth of the “American
challenge” to European manage
ment:
“In the new industries in which
transatlantic hostilities have begun
since the peace—chemicals, say, or
convenience foods—Europeans have
often had little trouble defending
themselves, and Americans even
less difficulty in losing glorious
sums. Much of the superior quality
of American management in Europe
in fact consists of this endearing
ability to suffer losses that would
send most Europeans to the poor
house . . .
“When a powerful commission
under Lord Franks, a former Brit
ish ambassador to Washington,
compared the defects of British
management with American virtues,
it saw one prime difference. The
Americans had myriad business
schools, Britain none. Ergo, build
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British business schools. . . . No
body unkindly observed that the
Germans, whose managers have
also handily outstripped the British,
had no business schools either.”
On mergers:
“Managers can only buy three
kinds of company—good, middling,
or bad—and in only one of two cir
cumstances—contested or uncon
tested (i.e., rape or seduction).
The perfect combination seems to
be the seduction of a truly beauti
ful company; but the seducer must
usually overpay, since beauties are
seldom bargains. He commonly
overpays still more in cases of op
posed rape, which commonly re
sults in an auction. Maybe, the
companies to buy are the raped,
bad ones. . . . Even here lies no
certainty; bad eggs make poor ome
lets. ... It takes a very bright ex
ecutive to make a merger into a suc
cess; and a very bright executive
often is too bright to try.”
On incentive compensation:
“By 1968, fully seventy-three of
the one hundred [largest American
corporations] had both stock op
tions and incentive awards; another
seven had incentive awards only;
seventeen had stock options only;
and three languished in the outer
darkness of straight old-fashioned
pay. Fewer than two-fifths of the
goodie-stuffed seventy-three bet
tered either the median perform
ance of Fortune’s five hundred larg
est companies for ten-years’ growth
in earnings per share, or the me
dian for profitability in that partic
ular year. . . . The less directly a
management’s pay was tied to the
company’s profit performance, sur
prisingly, the worthier the perform
ance became.”
On decentralization:
“Only when senior managements
change their entire life-styles, abdi
cate the interfering habits of a man
aging lifetime, and substitute the
fair but demanding standards of a
hungry investor, will decentraliza
tion be more than a myth—and of
ten an expensive one.”
On risk-taking:
“Theorists teach how to construct
decision trees, heraldic devices of

scientific management; and how to
marry the trees with probability
theory, so that the degree of risk
along each branch (each branch
and twig representing alternative
results of alternative courses of ac
tion) can be metered. But the meas
uring is spurious, and, anyway, the
best management doesn’t take risks.
It avoids them. It goes for the sure
thing.”
On long-range planning:
“The last few years have seen
errors of planning and missing of
objectives on a macabre scale. . . .
None of this has disturbed the plan
ning industry one whit. The longrange planners have been striving
to establish themselves as a separ
ate breed. . . . Some American com
panies already have brilliant vicepresidents who spend half their
year planning and the other half
converting the plan into an action
program for the next year. Which
conveniently leaves them no time
whatsoever for managing.
“... What goes wrong is that sen
sible anticipation gets converted
into foolish numbers; and their va
lidity always hinges on large, loose
assumptions. . . . The future . . .
is pure uncertainty, limited only by
the constraints of possibility. The
manager . . . can limit that uncer
tainty by thoughtful anticipation.
But, above all, if you want to mas
ter the future, you have to find out
what is really and truly happening
right now—and to make sure that
it is happening right.”
On new products:
“The genuine innovations, creat
ing whole new markets, thrusting
old companies into oblivion and
new ones into preeminence, are so
rare, and so rarely emanate from
big corporations, that the giants
are best off avoiding the chase. . . .
All businesses need an old product
policy—how to make the best of
what the company has.”
Reviewing this book in the New
York Times, Robert Townsend, the
former chief executive of Avis
Rent-A-Car, criticized the author
for not knowing much about man
agement and for leaning too heav
ily on interviews with management
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consultants (McKinsey & Company
is quoted frequently and with rev
erence); they also, says Mr. Town
send, lack first-hand experience in
management.
Mr. Townsend’s criticisms are
valid but not necessarily overrid
ing. Real knowledge of manage
ment is necessary only if you want
to write a constructive book, and
this book is not meant to be con
structive. It is a collection of ran
dom, often inconsistent, pot shots—
and some of them hit home. Above
all, it is a book that the author took
great delight in writing, and that
the businessman can take almost
equal delight in reading. It should
be read for its entertainment value
alone—and how many management
books are there of which that can
be said?

The Psychology of Computer
Programming by Gerald Wein
berg, Van Nostrand Reinhold Com
pany, New York, 1971, 288 pages,
$9.50.
Perhaps it is because so little
has been written on this subject.
Perhaps it is because of the authors
witty, penetrating, yet tolerant and
undogmatic style. Whatever the
reason, this is one of the most fas
cinating books in the computer field
that has been published for a long
time.

Dr. Weinberg, a professor of
computer systems at the School of
Advanced Technology, State Uni
versity of New York, says that with
this book he hopes to pioneer a new
field. His work is so convincing,
however, that it may run the risk
of being accepted as a Bible of
programing management rather
than as a ground-breaker for fur
ther research.
From this book the nature of the
computer programing process and
the way programers work emerge
with unprecedented clarity. Some
of the author’s conclusions are sup
ported by small-scale research
(conducted by his students);
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others, he cheerfully admits, are
entirely his own opinion based on
personal experience. Some are fam
iliar; some challenge accepted as
sumptions; some hit the reader with
a shock of belated recognition; all
have a ring of truth that rarely
comes through in a business book.
What does “good” mean?

Dr. Weinberg starts by trying to
analyze what makes a computer
program good, but (after suggest
ing that more supervisors should
make a practice of actually reading
programs) he concludes that the
question “is not a simple one, and
may not even be a proper ques
tion.” Similarly, he decides that . . .
“we cannot say what is a ‘good
programmer,’ ‘a good programming
manager,’ or, for that matter, ‘a
good piece of software.’ . . . we
should refrain from using the con
cept ‘good program’ or ‘good pro
gramer' as if it were something
universally agreed upon, or some
thing that even can be universally
agreed upon, or something that
even should be universally agreed
upon.”
Instead, he decides to describe,
in detail and with liberal use of
highly illuminating anecdotes, how
programers actually work, in
groups, in teams, on a project basis,
and individually. In the process he
touches on every aspect of pro
graming psychology that is import
ant to management, including or
ganization, leadership, aptitude
testing, training, compensation, and
choice of programing tools. (Only
the last section is in any way diffi
cult for a nonprogramer to follow.)
And in the process he gently de
bunks a number of standard prac
tices and assumptions:
On organization of the program
ing team:
. . the basic rule for
size and composition of program
ming teams would seem to be this
—for the best programming at the
least cost, give the best possible
programmers you can find sufficient
time so that you need the smallest
number of them. When you have
to work faster, or with less experi

enced people, costs and uncertain
ties will rise. In any case, the worst
way to do a programming project
is to hire hordes of trainees and
put them to work under pressure
and without supervision—although
this is the most common practice
today.”
On discrimination in hiring:
“Anybody who thinks Scotsmen are
cheap can point to an example of
a Scot who saved little pieces of
string; anyone who thinks Sicilians
are gangsters can show you a news
paper clipping to ‘prove’ his case;
and any manager who won’t pro
mote a woman can point to a case
where a woman was promoted and
then left to have a baby or to fol
low her husband to his new job.
And, of course, if a woman doesn’t
have babies or follow her husband,
he says, ‘What kind of a woman is
she?’ . . . Although prejudices
against other groups can also be
serious matters, the prejudice
against women is so common in
programming that it merits special
attention. Possibly the greatest sin
gle action to relieve the shortage
of programming and programming
management talent would be to
start treating women as true equals
—if indeed they are only that.”
On efficiency: “When Parkinson
said that ‘work expands to fill the
time allotted,’ he was making us
aware that the very existence of
scheduled goals can influence the
rate of work. But now we see that
the very existence of schedule as
a goal can influence ‘the time al
lotted.’ The reason work can ex
pand to fill the time allotted is the
existence of other goals whose im
portance relative to scheduling is
not made clear. Perhaps we might
follow this line of reasoning and
begin to understand what fallacies
underlie the generally accepted
conclusion that programming proj
ects can never be done on time.”
On testing: “But for actual pro
gramming performance, on com
mercial programs rather than ‘toy’
programs, we lack any aptitude
measure at all, except perhaps for
general intelligence. For myself, 1
believe that intelligence has less
Management Adviser

to do with the matter than person
ality, work habits, and training.
These things, unlike intelligence,
can be changed by experience later
in life, which turns the problem
from one of selecting programmers
to creating them. In other words,
good programmers are made, not
born; therefore we should turn our
attention to the manufacturing, or
training process.”
On training: “The one factor that
saves us in the computing educa
tion business is the computer itself
—ever silent, ever patient, ever
teaching the programmer who has
but the skill to learn. Perhaps we
should set as a goal for our schools
merely to leave the students alone,
so that they do not turn off to learn
ing before they get on the other end
of that log with the real teacher
of us all. It may be expensive, it
may be inelegant, it may be oldfashioned, but for programmers,
computer assisted instruction (but
not CAI!) is still the best.”
Dr. Weinberg’s principal pitch is
for a style of programing he calls
“egoless programming,” in which
programers turn to their peers to
have their work checked at every
stage of the program without loss
of face, jealousy, or ego involve
ment. He makes a good case for
this technique and explains fairly
clearly how to create the proper
environment for it.
That, of course, is primarily a task
for management, and, although,
programers will learn much from
it, this is primarily a book for man
agement, both the employers of
programmers and the users of their
work. Dr. Weinberg has tried, he
says, “to make the book interesting
and nontechnical, insofar as is pos
sible, so as to encourage the great
est number of people to read it: not
just programmers, but programming
managers and others connected
with programming in the many
ways we are connected with pro
gramming these days. . . . There
are, by various estimates, hundreds
of thousands of programmers work
ing today. If our experiences are
any indication, each of them could
be functioning more efficiently,
November-December, 1972

with greater satisfaction, if he and
his manager would only learn to
look upon the programmer as a hu
man being, rather than as another
one of the machines.”
That is why this book is a must
for everyone who works with com
puter programers. Reading it—un
like nearly every other book written
on programing—will not be a pain
ful task. Managers will actually
enjoy it.

Acquisition Behavior of U. S.
Manufacturing Firms by If. Igor
Ansoff, Richard G. Brandenburg,
Fred E. Portner, and H. Raymond
Radosevich, Vanderbilt University
Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1971, 146
pages, $7.95.

This study of the techniques and
results of acquisitions provides, its
authors claim, the most rigorous
analysis yet of two basic questions:
Do mergers constitute a more
promising growth method than in
ternal expansion? Does deliberate
and careful planning of merger ac
tivity produce more successful re
sults than unplanned opportunistic
behavior?
These authors studied the moti
vations, techniques, and results of
271 companies that had made ac
quisitions between 1946 and 1965
and compared them with 271 other
companies that had grown by in
ternal means to investigate the re
lationship between growth method
and firm performance.
The planning, search, evaluation,
and integration processes used by
the acquiring firms were studied
through the use of an extensive
questionnaire. Performance on a
number of standard financial meas
ures was calculated for all the com
panies through use of the data on
Standard and Poor Compustat
tapes. Performance and the method
of growth were then correlated to
see what worked best.
Factors such as growth rates,
sales, earnings, total assets, divi
dends, stock price, equity, payout,
and price/equity ratios were com
pared. Companies that had grown

by acquisition were found to hold
an unmistakable edge in earnings
on total capital over firms that had
not made acquisitions; otherwise,
the acquiring firms did not perform
better than the firms that had grown
by other means.
Acquiring firms generally exhib
ited a tradeoff in accomplishment.
Companies already considered to
be high-growth firms suffered a loss
in growth characteristics but im
proved their price/earnings ratios.
Low-growth firms improved their
growth images, but their price/
earnings ratios usually declined.
Most of the acquisition programs
studied tended to polarize into
either well planned, systematic
efforts or opportunistic, random
activities. Not surprisingly, compa
nies that went about their acqui
sition programs methodically, ana
lyzing company growth and need
for expansion, determining the sort
of acquisition that would best meet
their needs, searching for the most
appropriate companies to approach,
and following through carefully in
negotiations and in integrating the
acquisition, outperformed the com
panies that acquired or merged as
the opportunity presented itself,
without conscious planning. Not
only were the planners’ financial
averages higher on the average, but
they produced fewer cases of ex
tremely poor performance.
Conclusion: Acquisition is not
inherently a better way to grow
than any other, but planning is al
ways better than improvisation.
Abundantly
illustrated
with
tables, figures, and charts, ponder
ously but clearly written, this book
is probably useful in most wouldbe merger situations, and to mer
gees, and their consultants—al
though its conclusions are begin
ning to be familiar by now.

Correction — The price set for
Planning and Control in Man
agement: The German RPS Sys
tem by Walter and Ranier Schleip
(Peter Peregrinus Limited) is
£2.25, not $2.25 as was reported
in our last issue.
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Organizational Diagnosis by
Harry Levinson, Harvard Univer
sity Press, Cambridge, Massachu
setts, 1971, 557 pages, $20.

Dr. Levinson, who helped to pi
oneer the field of industrial psychi
atry while on the staff of The Men
ninger Foundation, here attempts
to adapt some elements of medical
diagnosis to organizational diag
nosis—via an “audit” outline derived
from psychoanalytic theory.
The very factors and forces that
have always made it difficult to
measure the effectiveness of busi
ness organizations—namely, the hu
man element—actually dictate what
an adequate diagnostic process
should be, Dr. Levinson says in the
preface to this book:
“An organization is a living sys
tem. It has components which,
taken together, comprise its whole.
These components interact with
each other and the whole with other
wholes and its own environment. It
grows and develops, has a history,
experiences crises, and adapts. An
organization, then, is like any other
living system. Therefore modes of
systematically studying and evalu
ating other systems might be ex
trapolated to the study of organi
zations.”
This was the theory which led
the author to develop this system
of management evaluation. He be
gan “with a crudely extrapolated
outline which I used for teaching
Fellows in The Menninger School
of Psychiatry. My intention was to
have them extend the basic exami
nation method in which they were
trained to the study of organiza
tions.”
This book is the result. It con
sists largely of a highly detailed
outline for use in organizational an
alysis (really a psychiatrically ori
ented management audit question
naire although not in questionnaire
form) plus an extended case study
illustrating its application. The out
line itself, which explains how to
note, assess, and diagnose the vari
ous facets of an organization’s his
tory, current actions, and directions
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and suggests a method of integrat
ing these data into a comprehensive
description from which the organi
zation’s strengths and weaknesses
should emerge clearly, is supported
by discussion of such standard
problems for the consultant as how
to enter the organization, how <to
present oneself to management and
employees, how to gather data, how
to organize and integrate the mate
rial, how to prepare a report, and
how to feed it back to the organi
zation. Each step is illustrated by
examples drawn from organizations
ranging from major corporations to
parish churches.
The heart of the book is the out
line, which, with its explanation,
takes up more than 300 pages of
not very large type. For the most
part it covers, in incredible detail,
the same ground that any consult
ant would cover. There are, how
ever, a number of psychiatric
touches that might well prove dis
concerting to an accounting-trained
analyst.
Some examples: “Assessment of
the discrepancy between reality
and perceived reality”; “Emotional
atmosphere of the organization”;
“Masculine-feminine orientation of
the organization”; “Space: How is
it conceptualized?”; “Psychological
contract unfulfillment”; “Third- and
fourth-order adaptive activities.”
The consultant who has not been
trained in psychoanalysis may well
be intimidated, not only by the
terminology, but also by the re
quirement to evaluate factors he
has not been trained to assess. Yet
Dr. Levinson evidently is offering
his outline as a possible manual for
the use of nearly any management
consultant. He says, “Although the
concept of the outline arises from
psychoanalytic theory and clinical
practice, combined with organiza
tional theory, it should serve a wide
range of people who have varied
orientations and skills. Most of the
fundamental data should be the
same for all.”
How effective some parts of this
framework for analysis would be in
the hands of consultants not trained
in psychiatry, or even psychology,

is a question. The casual way in
which Dr. Levinson offers it for
general use is startling, particularly
in view of the jealousy with which
analysts and psychologists usually
guard their prerogatives. As they
are fond of pointing out, a little bit
of amateur psychiatry can often be
dangerous. For the consultant who
is prudently aware of his own limi
tations in this area, however, this
book should offer many useful in
sights.

Briefly listed

Concepts for Corporate Strategy:
Readings in Business Policy by
John W. Bonge and Bruce P.
Coleman, The Macmillan Com
pany, New York, 1972, 603 pages,
$6.95 (paperbound).
This collection of 48 articles on
various aspects of business policy
contains material on management
systems; the role and perspective of
top management; goals, strategies,
and long-range plans; situation as
sessment; administrative functions;
expansion and contraction; interna
tional operations; and social and
political involvement.

MAGAZINES
Environmental Complexity and
Financial Reports by Henry Mill
er, The Accounting Review, Jan
uary, 1972.

A discussion of the possible ap
plicability of psychological findings
in the area of human information
processing to the information-over
load problem of financial state
ments.

Henry Miller has expanded upon
and drawn implications from argu
ments by Lawrence Revsine which
appeared in Revsine’s article “Data
Expansion and Conceptual Struc
ture,” in the October, 1970, Account
ing Review. In his article, Revsine
noted that psychological studies
suggest there exists an optimum
Management Adviser

level of environmental complexity
at which an individual is able to
process a maximum amount of in
formation. Individuals vary in their
conceptual structures; individuals
with concrete conceptual systems
are able to assimilate only relatively
simple amounts and dimensions of
data, and tend to react to the infor
mation in a fixed (somewhat non
thinking) manner. Others, with ab
stract conceptual systems, can deal
with much more complex and mul
tidimensional data, obtaining from
it meaningful relationships, com
binations, comparisons, etc. Studies
have shown, however, that when
a certain point of environmental
complexity is exceeded, individuals’
abilities to synthesize and deal
meaningfully with the information
decrease as more detail is presented
(regardless of the relevance of the
additional details), whether they
are operating from concrete or ab
stract conceptual systems.
Revsine notes that although this
model (relating environmental com
plexity and the spectrum of con
ceptual structures from concrete to
abstract) “is not yet demonstrably
relevant to the problem of data ex
pansion” in financial reports, there
is a possible dysfunctional effect of
increases in the environmental com
plexity (data-expansion in financial
reports). He suggests that empirical
testing of the applicability of the
model to an accounting context be
carried out.
Miller points out in his article
that the study from which Revsine
drew his implications for further
research relied on individuals’ func
tioning in a constant (admittedly
complex) environment, and receiv
ing the same set of information,
whereas individuals concerned with
the performance of a firm have
differential access to relevant data—
i.e., accounting reports, the state of
the economy, industry-wide trends,
advice of financial advisers, etc.
Given a scale of all possible levels
of environmental complexity, differ
ent classes of individuals would
have access to differentially com
plex information. Therefore, indi
viduals’ optimum levels of environ
November-December, 1972

mental complexity could very well
occur in different areas along the
scale of all levels of complexity,
depending on their access to in
formation.
To Miller, the most obvious im
plication from the studies is that
unlimited data expansion, as has
been suggested in recent years, will
lower the conceptual levels of finan
cial statement users.
Miller also says that the relevance
(to users’ decision models) criterion
for determining which information
should be included in financial re
ports will have to be modified or
limited by variations in conceptual
structures of users, because too
much information, though relevant,
will lower users’ conceptual levels.
Financial statement complexity

Financial statement information
can be geared as to complexity any
where along the spectrum from the
most concrete to the most abstract
processors. Miller’s solution is to
choose the financial analyst’s opti
mal environment, which he sup
ports by noting that analysts’ advice
is filtered to other information pro
cessors’ environments on a widescale basis. Also, he considers finan
cial analysts to have the most ab
stract conceptual structures of
financial statement users, and, if a
less abstract group of processors
were selected, the “opportunity to
educate users so they may develop
more abstract processing ability”
would be eliminated.
Miller elaborates upon Revsine’s
suggestions for empirical research
by proposing to test whether the
environment is chosen or constant,
and by suggesting that information
formats be tested with the goal of
maximizing financial analysts’ ab
stractness.
Miller implicitly assumes that
“success” can best be achieved for
all users by achieving the optimum
environmental (financial-statement)
complexity for those with the most
abstract structures, financial an
alysts.
Katherine Hohl
Oklahoma State University

Computers: Their Use and Mis
use by Joel E. Ross, Business Hori
zons, April, 1972.
In spite of the transformation of
clerical and accounting operations
through the use of computers, Mr.
Ross believes that computers have
had little effect on the operating
problems of management. Mr. Ross
lists four causes of the failure to
obtain economic benefits from com
puter operations. He then lists
some specific do’s and don'ts of
computer use, followed by six steps
of an approach to designing a com
puter system.

Mr. Ross states that, although the
computer has extensively trans
formed the accounting and clerical
operations of a business, it has had
little impact in the area in which it
has the largest potential payoff.
Only a very few companies (e.g.
Pillsbury, Weyerhauser, and West
inghouse) can justify their com
puter operations on a purely eco
nomic basis. The failure to obtain
economic payoffs from the com
puter can generally be traced to
four causes. First, an information
system can never substitute for a
management system. The lack of
managerial and operational appli
cations of the computer is serious
because it implies that the manage
ment functions of planning and
control are not being performed
effectively. This lack of a manage
ment system can never be corrected
simply by installing a computer.
Second, the author explicitly states
that top management must be in
volved in all major decisions relat
ing to the computer. Major com
puter decisions are too vital to be
left solely to computer technicians.
Third, a communication gap exists
between the manager who knows
what he wants and needs and the
computer technician who under
stands the capabilities and limita
tions of the computer. Fourth, many
companies have failed to organize
properly their computer operations
in relation to their total organiza
tional structure.
Mr. Ross then lists some specific
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do’s and don’ts of computer use.
The Don’ts of Computer Use—
(1) Don’t buy a turnkey operation.
Systems are more likely to work if
you design them yourself. (2) Don’t
spend all your money on hardware.
Money can be spent more profitably
on new applications and develop
ment. (3) Don’t let computer sales
men and the data processing man
ager make computer decisions.
Their expertise is in the area of
computer operations, not manage
ment improvement. (4) Don’t un
derestimate the time and expense of
developing a system. Such under
estimates are detrimental to both
the cost of the system and the cred
itability of the company. (5) Don’t
fall in love with your system. If the
system does not work, it must be
scrapped before more money is
lost. (6) Don’t try to install a man
agement information system with
out a management system. A suc
cessful management information
system can only be built on top of
a good management system.
The Do’s of Computer Use—(1)
Do get management involved. In
volvement of management in sys
tems design is essential for closing
the communication gap and getting
profitable applications. (2) Do
"eyeball” the output. Simple hu
man examination of the output can
catch expensive, embarrassing mis
takes. (3) Do upgrade your cleri
cal systems. Many managerial and
decision-making applications can
be implemented through your cler
ical staff. (4) Do put proposed proj
ects to the feasibility test. A system
must be judged feasible before it
is purchased. (5) Do develop an
MIS plan. The establishment of
an MIS plan will offset uncertainty,
improve economy of operations,
focus attention on objectives, and
provide a device for control of op
erations.
In conclusion, Mr. Ross sets forth
six steps in systems design that a
manager must participate in if he
wishes to develop a profitable com
puter operation. First, he must help
set system objectives. These objec
tives must not be vague generali
ties, but rather clear, concise state
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ments of what the user expects to
achieve.
Second, he must help identify the
internal and external constraints
that will cause the manager to
settle for a system below the "ideal”
one.
Third, he must help to determine
specific information needs and the
objectives they are designed to sat
isfy.
Fourth, he must help identify the
information sources necessary to
meet the informational needs which
are used to achieve the system ob
jectives.
Fifth, he must help apply the
system concept to the data flow,
i.e., the form and content of the in
puts to the computer and the out
puts from the computer.
Sixth, and last, he must help test
and implement the system. It is im
portant to remember that the old
system must not be discarded be
fore the new one is operational and
proven.
James M. Krueger
Indiana University

The Emerging Cost Revolution
In Data Processing Technology
by Herbert W. Robinson, Business
Management, August, 1971.

There is an increasing emphasis
in business periodicals on effective
ly utilizing the vast computer ca
pabilities made available through
advances in data processing tech
nology. In this article the author
advocates the use of time sharing
terminals to avoid excess in-house
EDP capacity.
American business is now in a
period of attitude readjustment con
cerning the elaborate computer sys
tems it has created, and the profes
sional staff required to run them. In
too many cases companies are now
utilizing less than half of the capa
bility which has been created and
are not receiving any of the cost
benefits originally anticipated.
Mr. Robinson feels that we will
soon see new developments in the
modes in which computers are used

in an enterprise. These advances
will be in the area of “giant central
computers capable of being utilized
effectively and simultaneously at a
large number of remote locations,
over existing common carrier lines
and through low cost input/output
terminals.” The obvious advantage
here is that the individual com
pany pays only for the data proc
essing time it uses.
Ry connecting a large number of
remote terminals to the central
processing unit a continuous flow
of processing can be achieved to
lower the cost per computation. An
other advantage of a large central
computer is that the limitations im
posed by smaller size in-house com
puters are removed and a wider
range of applications can be
achieved. Cost savings can also be
realized through the use of existing
communication lines (i.e., telephone
lines) which charge only for the
service provided. Computer costs
are directly related to operational
requirements, and, therefore, can be
quantified and more easily con
trolled.
Software costs are also decreased
by the use of time-sharing equip
ment due to an absence of repeti
tion in programing requirements. A
package of generalized programs
is available to all users with only
nominal modifications needed for
individual requirements.
The time sharing facilities can
be utilized by the medium- or
large-scale user, who already has
an in-house computer system, to
handle additional processing dur
ing peak periods. This allows the
business to plan its computer sys
tem on the basis of normal opera
tions rather than on the basis of
peak periods. The excess capacity
that would be created during less
than peak periods can be elimi
nated. As the company’s overall
needs increase the additional capa
city acquired can be kept below
total requirements to assure that all
facilities are utilized on a 100 per
cent basis.
Steven Flory
Louisiana State University
at Baton Rouge
Management Adviser

